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In this article, we explore whether regional economic cooperation in the form of 
growth triangle, made popular during the late 1980s, can continue to be relevant in the 
face of more formal arrangements as in free trade agreements (FTAs) and other bilateral 
‘closer economic partnerships’ (CEPs) initiatives in the recent years. In particular, the 
discussion is focussed on the Indonesia-Malaysia-Singapore growth triangle (IMS-GT) 
which is the pioneering arrangement in Southeast Asia. IMS-GT continues to be a 
successful mode of cooperation among the three countries and will remain a key and 
subtle framework for regional economic collaboration amidst the plethora of initiatives 
relating to FTAs and CEPs. This paper put forth a thesis that GT is part of a spectrum of 
regional cooperation efforts with convergence interest to be in synchrony with the global 
value chain. As long as the formation and implementation of GT contribute to the 
creation of value, it can co-exist with more formal arrangements like the FTAs and 
CEPs. 
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The end of the Cold War has reduced political tensions between Asian countries 
and consequently brought the region into a more globalizing production processes and 
increasing vertical integration. As competition cuts across national and sectoral 
boundaries and becomes increasingly global, firms everywhere are forced to shift from 
exports to international production. Countries like those of Thailand, Malaysia and 
Singapore have embarked on development strategies of attracting foreign capital and 
expanding exports to lift the economic performance and social well being of their 
populace. In tandem with active domestic industrial policies, such countries have also 
made concerted effort to promote regional cooperative arrangements with neighbouring 
countries. Spatially delineated domestic areas as in EPZ and SEZ, as well as cross-border 
economic zones as in ‘growth triangle’ and ‘economic corridor’ can be useful 
mechanisms to stimulate and/or synergize existing local economies. Transnational 
economic zones have utilized the different endowments of the various countries in 
Southeast and East Asia, exploiting cooperative trade and development opportunities. 
Furthermore, transfer of technology and manufacturing process between nations has 
allowed them to develop sustainable growth momentum in the global value chain amidst 
increasing international competition. 
 In this article, we explore whether regional economic cooperation in the form of 
growth triangle, made popular during the late 1980s, can continue to be relevant in the 
face of more formal arrangements as in free trade agreements (FTAs) and other bilateral 
‘closer economic partnerships’ (CEPs) initiatives in the recent years. In particular, the 
discussion is focussed on the Indonesia-Malaysia-Singapore growth triangle (IMS-GT) 
which is the pioneering arrangement in Southeast Asia. In the following section, the 
genesis and brief overview of the IMS-GT is provided. We seek to abstract some salient 
features that make the IMS-GT a successful mode of cooperation before considering the 
pertinent question of whether the IMS-GT, or more broadly GT, can continue to be 
relevant amidst the plethora of initiatives relating to FTAs and CEPs. In the third section, 
we put forth a thesis that GT is part of a spectrum of regional cooperation efforts with 
convergence interest to be in synchrony with the global value chain. As long as the 
development of GT contribute to the creation of value, it can co-exist with more formal 
arrangements like the FTAs and CEPs. 
 
 
2. Historical Overview of the IMS-GT 
 
Concerted actions to exploit complementarities among economic entities which 
have common national borders give rise to the formation of Growth Triangle (GT). 
These “sub-regional economic zones” involve areas that may be different in terms of 
their respective capitals but happen to be near to one another, geographically. The 
economic development of these areas is stimulated through promotion of trade and 
investment. The proximity of markets helps reduce costs. Foreign direct investments that 
are export-oriented should therefore find these growth areas attractive. Existing 
infrastructures will be improved to support the expansion of economic activities. GTs 
have played the role of a driving force for growth in Asian economies throughout the   3
1990s. Four growth triangles have been established since 1989, involving parts of 11 
countries. As shown on the map (Figure 1.1), there are currently eight growth polygons 
in East and Southeast Asia. The GTs typically group remote regions of the nations 
involved in an effort to exploit complementary assets within the groupings. For example, 
the Tumen Delta triangle integrates the capital and technology of Japan and the Republic 
of Korea with the natural resources of Russia and North Korea (i.e., the People's 
Democratic Republic of Korea) and the labor and agricultural resources of China. The 
governments of Brunei, East and West Kalimantan, and North Sulawesi of Indonesia; 
Sabah, Sarawak, and Labuan in Malaysia; and Mindanao and Palawan in the Philippines 
have given priority to expanding air and shipping routes within the East ASEAN Growth 
Area, another polygon. Another well known example: Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, 
Thailand, Vietnam, and China's Yunnan Province have been discussing ways to develop 
the Mekong area since 1992. In fact, the Greater Mekong Sub-region (GMS) Corridor 
has come in existence as a major regional development project strongly encouraged and 
supported by the Asian Development Bank (Thant, et.al., 1994). Thailand is expected to 
provide capital and experience in developing the GMS Corridor, though China will be 
another locomotive. It will encompass a population of over 400 million people offering 
low wages, rents, and land costs. 
The pioneering GT in Southeast Asia is that of the IMS-GT, and its evolution is 
very much tied to the economic development of the Singapore economy (Toh and Low, 
1993, Kakazu, 1997). Effective industrialisation of Singapore economy started in 1965 
when it became a sovereign state. Based on a development strategy that make intensive 
use of foreign capital and technology to supplement its dearth of entrepreneurship and 
small domestic market, industrial production expanded rapidly to create employment 
opportunities and export penetration into international markets. Prudent macroeconomic 
and social policies have helped to hone a workforce that is relatively skilled and 
facilitated the exploitation of geographical advantage to be a major trading and 
transportation centre for the region and the world. The Singapore economy grew rapidly 
at an average growth of seven percent over the last forty years. From the 1970s to the 
1980s, there was a shift in Singapore's self-conception from that of a global city to that of 
a key regional business centre. Since early 1990s, Singapore has concentrated on 
becoming the technology hub for Southeast Asia, sending labour-intensive operations to 
low-cost neighbouring countries like Malaysia and Indonesia in special mutual 
cooperative trade and development arrangements known as growth triangle (GT) or 
growth polygon. As a member of ASEAN, it will be in Singapore’s best interest to have 
the GT concept endorsed and accepted by the political leaders in ASEAN. 
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Figure 1:  Growth "Triangles" in Southeast and East Asia 
 
Source: Adapted from World Technology Evaluation Centre (http://www.wtec.org/) 
 
 
Rising labour and land costs have made Singapore a less favourable place for 
manufacturing activities which are labour and space intensive. Instead of doing nothing 
and allowing ‘footloose’ characteristics of foreign MNCs residing in Singapore to 
materialise, the economic planners in Singapore have been actively interested and 
involved where possible in the private corporations’ plans to relocate their production 
bases in the face of rising domestic costs and cheaper resource destinations abroad. An 
orderly decanting exercise was being planned. The long established good will and 
business relation with foreign corporations were being cherished. Rather than the 
production bases move far away without any further linkage, it will be useful to have 
these ‘footloose’ production bases move to neighbouring countries and continue to 
maintain gainful economic linkages with Singapore. Production bases in neighbouring 
countries could still provide Singapore will a good source of income when they make use 
of Singapore’s service hub to meet their needs for transportation, finance and other 
headquarter services and facilities.  Furthermore, the orderly decanting exercise will also 
add favourably to Singapore foreign policies and international goodwill in helping 
neighbouring countries to climb the development ladder. Involving Malaysia and 
Indonesia, Singapore’s two nearest neighbours is a natural choice to start a triangular 
arrangement as there were two existing bilateral arrangements, one linking Singapore 
with Riau and the other connecting Singapore with Johor. The concept of a growth 
triangle, encompassing Singapore, Johor, and Riau, with different comparative 
advantages or factor endowments to form an economic zone was first articulated in 
December 1989 by Singapore's then First Deputy Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong. With 
the fall of the Berlin Wall, the intensification of European Economic Integration, and the 
seemingly righteous policy recommendations of the Washington Consensus, the GT 
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During the Fourth ASEAN Summit in 1994, ASEAN leaders mandated the 
establishment and promotion of sub-regional economic arrangements among ASEAN 
members and between ASEAN members and non-ASEAN economies. Such 
arrangements are designed and expected to stimulate the economic dynamism of the 
ASEAN region, to sustain the innovative spirit and to complement overall ASEAN 
economic cooperation. Subsequently, the Governments of Singapore, Malaysia and 
Indonesia agreed to establish a sub-regional cooperative framework originally known as 
the SIJORI Growth Triangle, combining politically motivated and market-driven factors. 
When contiguous provinces joined the Growth Triangle, the arrangement became known 
as the Indonesia- Malaysia-Singapore Growth Triangle (IMS-GT). The amount of 
investments generated in the IMS-GT has been very significant. It has attracted $10 
billion in private sector investments during its first five years. Both Malaysia and 
Indonesia provided tax and financial incentives for firms to move to their jurisdictions to 
avoid rising costs in Singapore. Although Japan was the largest overall investor in 
Malaysia for 1981-90, Singapore was the largest investor in Johor state, followed by 
Taiwan. By 1991, Singapore is the largest investor in Batam, followed by the US and 
Japan, in real estate, tourism, metal processing, drilling equipment, and electronic 
component assembly (Toh and Low, 1993).  
 
Positive Spillover to Batam 
 
IMS-GT's development involved political decisions to reduce barriers to 
investment and trade although, to date, growth has taken place more on the Singapore-
Riau and Singapore-Johore axes instead of the Johore-Riau axis because of conflicting 
complementarities. The Singapore-Johore leg is more informal than the Singapore-Riau 
segment as the latter is reinforced by bilateral agreements over Batam and Bintan. Figure 
2 shows the complementarities in a schematic form. Singapore's enthusiasm for the 
triangle highlights its desire for greater interdependence ameliorating security concerns 
with its neighbours. In terms of a internal hierarchy, Singapore has focused more on 
becoming a regional finance, business and high-technology centre while unskilled and 
semi-skilled, labor intensive industries (textiles, chemicals, food processing) move to 
Batam and Johore respectively.  
 
The establishment of the IMS-GT has spurred the development of Batam Island 
in Indonesia. An island  with an area 45km x 25km (about two thirds the size of 
Singapore) and population of about a million, is located only 20km from Singapore and 
25km from Johore in Malaysia, Batam is Indonesia's equivalent to China's SEZ's 
(Special Economic Zones) - a place where the nation's economic planners test new 
economic policies and ideas. Strategically located on the Indian and Pacific Oceans, 
Batam Island is also the second most popular international tourist destination in 
Indonesia.  Due to its Free Trade Zone status since 1971, strategic location, low cost 
structure, skilled work force, and tax and other investment incentives, Batam Island has 
attracted over 700 foreign companies from 34 countries and well over $3 billion in 
foreign investment. Together with the foreign enterprises, there are around 9,500 local 
companies spread over 17 industrial estates and swathes of other land made available 
directly by Batam Industrial Development Authority (BIDA) for major establishments 
like shipyards. Sectors include, but are not limited to, technology, medical equipment 
and electronics, telecommunications, agribusiness, textiles, industrial assembly and 
fabrication, shipbuilding, oil and energy services. Prominent investors include 
McDermott International, AT&T, PerkinElmer, Bechtel, Seagate Technology, Babcock 
& Wilcox, Holiday Inn, Matsushita, Kyocera, Hitachi, Sanyo, Nippon Steel, Hyundai,   6
Siemens, Sony and Philips.  Current investment priorities include wastewater treatment, 
hospital, medical and educational facilities, and port harbor expansion. In parallel with 
these investments, Bintan island, another island sited next to Batam, has experienced the 
transformative influx of capital from Singapore in industrial parks and high end tourism 
facilities. (Chang, 2001) 
 
 











- access to world markets
- advanced physical infrastructure








Source: Adapted from Debrah et al. (2000) 
 
 
The Indonesian Government investment in Batam to date is put at more than 
$US2 billion with private investment amounting to around $7 billion. The bulk of the 
economic activities is in export-oriented manufacturing, fostering economic (GDP) 
growth such as that of 7.7 per cent per annum recorded for 2003 and providing 
employment for more than 260,000 workers. In 2004, more than 47 new foreign 
companies with investments exceeding US$43 million, set up production bases in Batam. 
Batam reportedly generates about 14 per cent of Indonesia’s export income other than oil 
and gas. There are some 40 shipyard industries and other heavy oil rig fabrication and 
steel fabrication plants. But most of the enterprises consist of electronics and computer 
related manufactures like audio and video equipment and printed circuit boards. Other 
products include leather goods, shoes, garments, toys, household products and health 
care products. Tourism is emerging as a major industry with around 1.3 million visitors a 
year, making Batam Indonesia’s second most popular destination after Bali. There are 
more than 6,000 hotel and resort rooms, many of international class. There are two 
marinas and six international standard golf courses.  
 
The success of Batam in attracting investments is no less due to the willingness 
and determination of officials to adopt measures that cut through the red tape of other 
Indonesian regions with one-stop interfaces, speedy processing of development 
proposals and co-operative handling of visa applications for key people. Potential 
investors also have been wooed with a raft of investment allowances, tax concessions   7
and exemptions going beyond the benefits of Batam’s duty free status. Laws have been 
relaxed to allow foreign ownership of houses and commercial property and enterprises 
can be established without any requirement for Indonesian ownership participation – the 
business or company can be wholly foreign owned. Secure land leases are available for 
up to 80 years and are extendable.  
 
Another attraction for investing in Batam has recently been added: the duty-free 
importation of Batam-made technology and medical equipment components into the U.S. 
as ‘extensions’ of Singapore’s manufacturing base under the recently enacted U.S.-
Singapore Free Trade Agreement. While its proximity to a dynamic Singapore economy 
is an asset to capitalize on, signs of the future Batam are now emerging with the 
development of Batam Center, a new and modern administrative hub that ultimately will 
supplant old Nagoya as Batam’s main business district. The modern architecture, 
obvious planning and permanent presence embodied in the major buildings of the new 
zone are in striking contrast to the urban environment of the early days. 
 
The pioneering experience of IMS-GT has led to the development of other 
growth areas. For example, the Indonesia-Malaysia- Thailand Growth Triangle (IMT-
GT) represents the second major ASEAN effort at linking three complementary areas 
that belong to different participating countries, in the northern part of ASEAN. The 
natural resources of the IMT-GT represent a vast economic potential that could be 
realized through sub-regional cooperation. As in the IMS-GT, multinational corporations 
may be interested in expanding their resource-based investments by opting to relocate 
their industries to the sub-region, thereby increasing their competitiveness. 
 
 
3.  Do GTs complement the FTAs and other trade arrangements? 
 
Recent developments in the external environment have worked in tandem to raise 
awareness of the need to hasten the process of intra-ASEAN economic integration. These 
developments include (a) the stalling of multilateral trade talks; (b) the economic 
emergence of China and India and concomitant concerns about the loss of ASEAN’s 
global competitiveness, and (c) the spate of new free trade agreements (FTAs) being 
negotiated in Asia.(Rajan, 2004). These are impetus for the ASEAN Capitals to review 
and re-assess their domestic and regional economic policies to cope with new 
international development. Unilateral actions by individual country to cope with 
international trends is of grave concern and as they run counter to the spirit and intent of 
the Common Effective Preferential Tariff (CEPT) agreement signed in 1992, which lead 
to the establishment of the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA). For instance, deviation and 
delay in fulfilling liberalizing commitments: in the case of motor vehicles and parts by 
Malaysia; agricultural products by Indonesia, and petrochemical products by the 
Philippines, put AFTA in jeopardy. It will also cast doubts on ASEAN being a prime 
partner in support of the 1994 Bogor Declaration was signed by APEC leaders at a 
summit meeting in Indonesia, to push for a free trade area in the Asia Pacific by 2020.  
 
While the overall economic impact of the new wave of FTAs remains unclear and 
somewhat controversial, there is a suggestion that a return to GT as a mode of promoting 
trade liberalisation and growth is being made (Low, 2003). Looking back in the past 
thirty or so years, preferential trading arrangements (PTAs) have not played a significant 
role in the integration of ASEAN economies. Intra ASEAN trade has accounted for only 
about one-fifth of ASEAN’s total merchandise trade (See Figure 3) and this share having   8
remained stagnant over the last decade (and much of the intra-ASEAN trade is due to 
Singapore). The share is far lower than other regional economic alliances such as the 
European Union (65 percent) or the North American Free Trade Area (50 percent). 
Indeed, the fastest trade growth within the region has been the growth of trade with 
China since 1979, and this has occurred in the absence of formal trade-liberalization 
agreements. Such trends toward spontaneous regional integration result from progressive 
outward orientation of individual economies’ trade and investment policies and unilateral 
liberalization of goods and capital markets (Dobson, 1997).  
 
 
Figure 3: Total ASEAN Exports, 1990 - 2003 
Total ASEAN Exports, 1993 - 2003
 
Source: ASEAN Secretariat 
 
In recognition of these concerns, at the Bali summit in October 2003, the ten 
ASEAN leaders agreed to the goal of creating an ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) 
by 2020. The primary objective of the AEC is to deepen and accelerate intra-regional 
economic integration by liberalising trade, investment and skilled labour flows and 
addressing behind-the-border barriers, thus creating a single production base and single 
market. According to a McKinsey report on the competitiveness of ASEAN, 
commissioned by the ASEAN Secretariat, deeper integration could shave almost one-
fifth off total costs of production in ASEAN. The High-Level Task Force (HLTF) on 
economic integration established by the ASEAN Economic Ministers suggested specific 
initiatives to advance the process of regional economic integration. These include: (a) 
hastening of customs clearance and simplifying custom procedures; (b) eliminating tariff 
and non-tariff barriers to trade; (c) accelerating the implementation of the Mutual 
Recognition Arrangements (MRAs) for key sectors; (d) harmonizing standards and 
technical regulations; (e) creating a more effective ASEAN Dispute Settlement 
Mechanism (DSM) and (f) fast tracking of liberalization of eleven priority sectors
1. 
                                                 
1 These sectors are automotive, wood-based products, rubber-based products, textile and apparel, agro-
based products, fisheries, electronics, air travel, tourism, information & communication technologies 
(ICT), and healthcare.   9
  
While it is laudable to have an impressive agenda of action, it does not elaborate 
on the mechanisms in which the initiatives can be operationalized and implemented. 
Formation of growth triangles could be one of the mechanisms
2.  G T  a s  a  f o r m  o f  
regional cooperation provides a competitive model to attract investment and technology 
as well as a building block towards FTA. As a starter, GT, with relatively less rigid and 
formal cooperation structure as compared to FTA, is expected to be more innovative, 
flexible, and most importantly always ready to attend to the ever-changing needs of 
investors and alike. GT as a strategy promoted by both regional leaders keen on 
expanding ‘embedded exportism’ and by global enterprises involved in international 
production see it as having a ‘facilitating effect’ upon ‘open regionalism’ championed in 
the Bogor Declaration (Bergsten, 1995; Sum 2002). 
 
The next issue of concern is whether GT has become a building block towards 
free trade arrangements (FTAs)? Huff (1995) argued that the changes that are manifested 
in the growth triangle strategy provide supports for ASEAN’s AFTA and APEC’s free 
trade plans.
3  The emergence and rise of mega economies like China and India has 
somewhat derailed the development path of large economies like Indonesia in ASEAN; 
forcing them to ‘de-industrialize’ and renew the emphasis and reliance on resource 
industries. The regional discourse in Singapore’s foreign economic policy is also 
influenced by concerns about emerging regional trade blocs, a more assertive local 
capitalist class concentrated in the financial service sector, and the state's increasing 
regional economic role. The Singaporean understanding of regionalism sees regions as 
concentric and overlapping circles of linkage. Inherent in this metaphor is an important 
ambiguity: concentric circles unlike pyramids do not constitute an economic hierarchy. 
Its economic health and destiny is very much dependent on the growth and progress of 
the region consists of countries with disparate level of development. Economic leveling 
up of the regional economies is viewed positively as a contribution to Singapore’s 
economic future, and economic integration is an avenue to that goal. From the 
perspectives of other ASEAN members, regional economic integration must show its 
worth in ameliorating domestic economic woes of lack of capital formation and 
unemployment, and in fostering a successful path to modernism. ASEAN as a regional 
grouping has doubled its membership from five in 1967 to the current ten. With a 
combined population of more than 600 million, ASEAN can be a voice of considerable 
influence in international fora. Concurrence in views among all members of a large 
organization is often difficult. Nonetheless, ASEAN has experimented with various 10 
minus X initiatives. In other words, some ASEAN projects need not involved every 
member. For instance, new members to ASEAN are allowed different time durations to 
complete the liberalization program under AFTA; and the formation of FTA between an 
ASEAN member and non-ASEAN members despite the existence of AFTA is not 
restricted. While there are concerns about the complication arising from rules of origin 
(ROO) in many overlapping FTAs, members are willing to learn how the associated 
encumbrances can be overcome. Weatherbee (1995) argues the larger the number of 
participants increases the possibility of non-cooperation. Extensive perceived 
asymmetries between states will affect the decision of smaller, less developed members. 
                                                 
2 One can also observe that sub-regional arrangement within ASEAN is being accepted. A case in point is 
the establishment of the Singapore-Thailand Enhanced Economic relationship (STEER) targeted as a high 
level forum to intensify bilateral economic cooperation across various sectors (agriculture and food, life 
science, automotive parts and components, and financial services). 
3 Huff (1995) page 364-370.  Deyo (1987) and Rodan (2001) also share similar views on this issue. 
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Security considerations will usually outweigh economic cooperation. Cross-border 
economic zones like GTs will thrive on earlier cooperation. These will spawn future 
SEZs and provide a transactional structure of sub-regional multilateralism occurring 
within a larger existing regional cooperation institution. ASEAN’s experience with GTs 
should be harnessed to push for deeper integration. 
 
Amidst the fervor of establishing FTAs with many trading partners, Singapore 
has included quite an ‘extra-ordinary’ clause in the US-Singapore FTA which comes into 
effect in January in 2004. The Integrated Outsourcing Initiative (ISI) included in the US-
Singapore FTA is recognition of the nature of global production chain where outsourcing 
has become a common practice. The inclusion of ISI implies that some 266 types of IT 
and medical related products produced in off-shore production bases such as Batam, can 
be treated as originated from Singapore and hence eligible tariff free importation into 
U.S. This will make products manufactured in Batam more competitive and undoubtedly 
gives a new perspective and relevance to IMS-GT.  FTAs have helped to re-focus 
investor attention on Singapore and the region which is in danger of dropping out of the 
radar screen with keen competition from China and India vying for foreign investments. 
  
 
4.  Growth Triangle and the Global value Chain 
 
Conventionally, GT is viewed as an exercise in spatial economic organization to 
‘re-territorize’ contiguous space to achieve economies based on differences in resource, 
cultural and technological endowments (van Grunsven, 1995; Sparke et al., 2004). From 
a theoretical perspective, the rationale for a GT can be made via the recognition of 
international production in a global value chain (GVC). We cannot avoid but to 
recognize the importance of value chain (VC) as an important ingredient for GT to bear 
sweet economic fruit. The value chain describes the full range of activities that are 
required to bring a product from its conception to its end use and beyond. This includes 
activities such as design, production, marketing, distribution and support to the final 
consumer.  
 
It is particularly important to note that value chains involve activities of dividing 
stages of productions among multiple firms and spread across wide range of geographic 
space, hence the term “global value chain” might be more often used. The importance of 
value chain is even more pronounced when the stages of production can be divided 
across multiple firms that reside in nearby geographical location, a situation in which GT 
is. While many firms have had international operations and trading relationships for 
decades and a few for more than a century, in recent years we have seen the formation of 
global scale economic systems which are tightly integrated and often managed on a day-
to-day basis. Today, the process of economic development cannot be isolated from these 
global systems, needless to mention sub-regional system. This means that firms and 
workers in widely separated locations affect one another more than they have in the past. 
Some of these effects are quite straightforward, as when a firm from one country 
establishes a new factory or engineering center in another country, and some are more 
complex, as when a firm in one country contracts with a firm in another country to 
coordinate production in plants owned by yet another firm in a third country, and so on.  
Regions are increasingly tied into global value chains that are characterized by forms of 
“private global governance” beyond pure market coordination; and increasingly faced 
with global (technical, social, ecological, etc.) standards which are defined and often 
monitored by global policy networks (Messner, 2002).   11
Much of the literature that seeks to categorize cross-border economic activity 
emphasizes two options: market or hierarchy. Firms either invest offshore directly or buy 
goods and services from foreign firms. A smaller body of literature has noted the 
prevalence of network forms of organization where there is some form of "explicit 
coordination" beyond simple market transactions but short of vertical integration. While 
this is a useful insight, a broad review of the literature clearly shows differences in such 
"network" forms of cross-border organization
4. The GVC framework propounded by 
researchers of the University of Sussex categorizes and provides an explanation for these 
variations. Furthermore, if one of the variables changes then value chain governance 
patterns tend to change in predictable ways. For example, the advent of a new 
technology can render an established VC based on relation becomes obsolete and 
perhaps captive networks and even vertical integration would become more prevalent.  
 
The relevance of the above discussion is to highlight the importance of being able 
to plug into the GVC. IMS-GT will continue to be viable and play a locomotive role for 
the rest of the economy as long as it can remain an important and useful component of 
the GVC.  It is pertinent for economic actors, firms, workers and policy makers to better 
understand how VCs function and able to benefit from thinking about their competencies 
relative to other actors in the chains they participate in or hope to participate in. What is 
the division of labour in the chain, how might this be changing, and why? Where are the 
various functions within VCs located geographically? Are there nodes of excellence to 
be found in particular places? What are the prospects for upgrading one's position with 
VCs? Are there competencies to be acquired, codification schemes to learn, or kinds of 
relationships to develop or steer away from? The formation and implementation of GT 
with officials well versed with the tools in VC analysis will be in a good position to bring 
success to regional economic integration in a wider scale. 
 
The emergence of growth triangles could be seen as an example of cooperation in 
managing economic interdependence. It is part of a changing regional and global 
division of labor where industrial restructuring in growth zone participants' economies 
are driven by political, technological and economic factors. For MNCs located in the 
triangles, they may be pursuing a globalization or global localization/glocalization 
strategy. The former involves a worldwide intra-firm division of labor where vocational 
strategies are based on scale economies and comparative advantage. Production is geared 
to world markets and standardized tastes with R&D research spread throughout. The 
latter is based on a geographically concentrated inter firm division of labor with 
integrated supply, distribution, and production chains in major regions. Production is 
geared towards local/regional markets and tailored to suit differences, while basic 
research is concentrated at home and applied research is decentralized.
5 
 
Ability to accommodate both strategies will be a double assurance for being 
‘locked’ into the GVC. Put plainly, it is important to recognize “producer-driven GVC” 
in contrast to ‘buyer-driven GVC”. "Producer-driven VCs" involve transnational 
subsidiaries linked to a core manufacturer, which then distributes its mass production to 
                                                 
4 The network forms and VC governance, according to the University of Sussex GVC Initiatives, can be 
categorized into (a) Pure Market, (b) Modular Value Chain, (c) Relational Value Chain; (d) Captive Value 
Chain, and (e) Hierarchical Value Chain. For more detail discussion, see 
http://www.globalvaluechains.org/ 
 
5 A more detail discussion can be found in Oman (1994) and Ruigrok and van Tulder (1995).   12
distributors and retailers
6. Examples characteristic of such capital and technology 
intensive sectors, include cars, computers, aircraft, and heavy machinery. Transnational 
subcontracting and alliances are common. In contrast, "Buyer-driven VCs" involve 
decentralized, flexible production networks where branded companies and retailers have 
both primary and secondary ties to trading firms, overseas factories, and trading 
companies. These labor- intensive consumer goods include toys, footwear, garments, and 
consumer electronics. Profits are derived from design, marketing, and retail service, 
rather than economies of scale or advanced technology. GTs such as the IMS-GT, can be 
will be effective handmaiden to intensify export oriented industrialization in ASEAN 
countries with indigenous firms and subsidiaries developing export niches in textiles, 
consumer goods, electronics, and transport equipment initially, moving into 
semiconductors and integrated circuits more recently. 
 
IMS-GT can currently be identified as part of the buyer-driven VC involving 
exports primary commodities, export processing or assembly, component subcontracting, 
original equipment manufacturing (OEM), and original brand name manufacturing 
(OBM). OEM requires producers to make finished products to be sold under another 
brand name. This requires design interpretation, quality control, and on-time delivery by 
the producer and supporting firms, which learn to develop backward linkages. The IMS-
GT with more than 6000 MNCs located in one of its partner: Singapore will be in an 




In this article, we have explored whether Growth Triangle as a mode of regional 
economic cooperation can continue to be relevant amidst growing activities in the 
formation of FTAs. The IMS-GT will be a role model in ASEAN. Its vibrancy and 
continued growth will have positive spillover effects to all the participating countries. 
Looking at both the past records and the prospective international trends of international 
production, GT is expected to co-exist with FTAs. In fact, it is argued that GT will play a 
significant role in regional economic development if GT can be established as conduits 
for both local and foreign corporations to be immersed in the global value chain. It is 
imperative that economic planners in developing economies recognize the importance in 
value chain analysis and knowledge of it will help greatly in shaping and formulating 
policies that will deepen integration and engender larger economic benefits.  
 
As a matter of fact, following the recent meeting on 18 March 2006 between 
Indonesian Vice-President Jusuf Kalla and Singapore Minister of Foreign Affairs George 
Yeo, the two Indonesian Islands of Batam and Bintan are once again in the limelight. 
Indonesia is keen on tapping Singapore’s experience in developing industrial estate
7 to 
help improve the investment climate and competitiveness on the two islands, as well as 
establishing SEZs in other provinces. Singapore will be helping Indonesian authority to 
hammer out policies for SEZs and to train manpower. Concurrently, the Indonesian 
government is pro-actively addressing complaints received from businessmen on poor 
enforcement of law, tangled tax policies, frequent demonstrations, dualism between 
Batam city administration and Batam authority agency amongst other problems. The 
                                                 
6 Similar to value chain, commodity chains and their link to the global capitalistic system is discussed 
extensively by Gary Gereff (1994 and 1995). 
  
7 Singapore’s expertise and experience in industrial estate development have been tapped and refined in 
several emerging economies: China, Vietnam, and India.    13
Indonesian government recognizes the urgency in fixing these problems and how these 
resolutions will have critical bearing on the success of the economic policy reforms in 
the country. These developments augur well for brighter economic prospects for the 
IMT-GT.   14
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